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PRINICIPLES AND PARADOXES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Delivered at a Conference on the Dialogue of Cultures, Center for Ethics and Culture,
Notre Dame, December 2007)
On paper, contemporary international law forms an impressive corpus. States
habitually invoke the law of nations against one another even as they themselves violate
its requirements. 1 Citizens criticizing their own state’s policies often invoke international
law. The law of nations even includes a doctrine of jus cogens, sometimes held to be
superior even to the United Nations Charter, according to which treaties and diplomatic
practices can be held ‘unconstitutional.’ 2 In practice, however, the international
community’s lack both of an enforcement authority and of a stable customary morality
renders international law erratic at best. (I do not here distinguish communities and
societies – no one holds that the international community or the United States is a
community in the way a well-functioning family is.)
Two issues arise, one conceptual and one normative, linked by the fact that law is
a ‘pro-word’; in less positivistic terms, it carries authority.
1. Is international law, insofar it purports to control the behavior of States,
law?
2. Why should we care about what a skeptic is likely to call ‘legal niceties’
when they interfere with our collective purposes?

AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Condolezza Rice, now Secretary of State, wrote in 2000, “foreign policy in a
Republican Administration … will … proceed from the firm ground of the national
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interest, not from the interest of an illusory international community.” 3 And, going
beyond traditional ‘realists’ such as Hans Morgenthau, 4 she added, “American values
are universal; people want to say what they think, worship as they wish, and elect those
who govern them; the triumph of these values is assuredly easier when the balance of
power favors those who believe in them.” 5 The same arguments could have been made
on behalf of the Athenians at Melos.
Rice’s views are inconsistent with the presuppositions of international law, which
requires a society, whose law it is. All forms of human society are imagined (which is
not to say, imaginary) communities, and the human race as a whole is no worse off in this
respect that the United States. And if there is an international community, the maxim,
ubi societas, ibi jus, guarantees the existence of some sort of law. For we are creatures
who need to work out the rules of our association, and who spontaneously recognize one
another as potential friends as well as potential enemies. .
The interdependence and internal fragmentation of states undermine the
assumption that states are the only significant actors in world politics, each guided by
something coherent called the ‘national interest.’ 6 But such globalizing trends run
parallel with the increasing difficulty in securing the co-operation our situation requires,
both among and within nation-states. In a baffling world, the greater ease of dealing only
with one’s own kind makes xenophobia perpetually attractive. 7
Even if the international community lacks a common good, it has a common bad.
International law rests on a doomsday scenario: the destruction of civilization through
uncontrolled conflict. The current version is breakdown into an array of armed bands
struggling for diminishing resources to meet to their increasing needs, stoking their
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mutual hostilityy with atavistic myths; and, sooner or later, employing weapons of mass
destruction. All (or nearly all) international actors have an interest in avoiding such
results. Hence international actors have built a ‘morality of accommodation,’ to make it
possible for peoples to live together. 8

Nearly all such actors, including the United

States, sometimes exempt themselves from the resulting standards and take a free ride on
the observance of others.

PARADOXES
Both the international morality of the accommodation and the law it supports are
subject to a number of debilitating paradoxes.

Human Rights
The concept of crimes against humanity has formed the foundation of a new
departure in international law. The first prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal, Antonio
Cassese, points out, “in the notion of ‘crimes against humanity’, `humanity’ did not mean
‘mankind’ or ‘human race’ but the ‘quality’ or ‘concept’ of man.” 9

British jurist

Geoffrey Robertson gives a different explanation: such crimes “were committed against
humanity in general because the very fact a person can order them diminishes the human
race.” 10 Both formulations imply all human beings have an interest in maintaining our
shared status, whether infringed in the victim or the perpetrator, and this shared interest
creates the rudiments of a human, and hence also of an international, community. Thus
Lung Chu-Chen, a Taiwanese international lawyer now teaching in the United States, has
said, “the individual… acting both alone and as a group representative, is the ultimate
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participant [in international law], performing in functions relevant to making and
applying law.” 11
Every significant political actor now pays lip service to the notion of universal
human rights. But violation of even the most elementary rights is now a daily
occurrence. And there is no agreement upon either the reason we have such rights or
the principles for resolving disputes about their content. Unusually for an international
document, the American Convention on Human Rights (or Pact of San José) (1978), like
many such documents is singed but not ratified by the United States, attempts to answer
the fundamental question. “For the purposes of this Convention, ‘person’ means every
human being” (Art. 1 § 2). It further specifies, “the right [to life] shall be protected by
law and, in general, from the moment of conception” (Art. 4 § 1). We need not inquire
further why this document has been neglected.
But the emphasis on human rights stands in stark contrast with the working
assumptions of diplomatic practice, which only tentatively recognizes non-State actors as
participants, and even then prefers potential States such as peoples demanding selfdetermination. Even more radical innovations, such as the rights asserted on behalf of
indigenous peoples and the claims made on transnational corporations, prefer fictional to
real persons. When international law speaks the language of human rights, moreover, it
is oriented toward the control of ethnic, i.e., group, conflicts. Torture, for example, is
defined in international law as the intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering,
whether physical or mental, by or with the consent of a public official – in other words, as
an offense against political outsiders rather than as a manifestation of individual
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depravity. 12 Rape likewise is treated as an assault by one ethnic group on another
through its women members – in other words political rather than a sexual offense. 13

International Economic Justice
Michael Walzer points out that in a decentralized international regime, “the forces
that oppose equality will never have to face the massed power of the globally
dispossessed, for there won’t be one global arena where this power can be massed.” 14
Likewise, in the absence of a common framework of social justice expressed in law, there
are no principles available for assessing the claims of the dispossessed, and demands for
international distributive justice invite a free-for-all.
An international context presses on a weak point in liberal theories of social
justice.

Rawls had argued in A Theory of Justice that a system of natural liberty unjust

on the ground that, “it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by …
factors … arbitrary from a moral point of view.” 15 Charles Beitz applies Rawls’
argument to international affairs. “If evidence of global economic and political
interdependence shows the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation, we should
not view national boundaries as having fundamental moral significance.” 16 As
Libertarians 17 and Communitarians 18 have both pointed out, however, it does not follow,
from the premise, that I do not deserve my talents and the social circumstances (such as
being born in a rich country) that enable me to develop them, that any other human being
or group can claim my talents either.
The later Rawls rejects any deduction of principles of justice from universal and
necessary premises, while attempting to apply the notion of reasonable pluralism to a
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wider variety of outlooks. When Rawls defines the original position from which he
derives the law of peoples, he assumes that the parties are “citizens of some liberal
democratic society, though not the same one” and “know that reasonably favorable
conditions obtain that make constitutional democracy possible.” 19 His theory is, like the
World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund, a vehicle by which rich
countries impose terms on poor ones – perhaps acceptable as a modus vivendi, but hardly
an imperious requirement of justice.
Rawls’ critics ‘from the left’ argue that what he describes as failure to provide aid
is in fact harming. 20 In evaluating this claim, everything depends on our background
picture of politics outside a particular civil society. If we view human history as largely
one of predation, and moments of generosity and concern for injustices done others as
exceptional, we will reach different understandings of present practice than if we regard
the West as violating a paradise inhabited by noble savages. Moreover, any of the people
who claim compensation for past injuries would not exist, as cultural and biological
entities, but for these injuries; hence questions of transgenerational justice raises difficult
metaphysical issues. Finally, the dangers of imperialism latent in demands for economic
justice are serious in a world in which people in poor countries desire to maintain their
independence while reaping the benefits of modernity. Martha Nussbaum has made it
clear in many writings that she is prepared to subject the familial and communal life of
men and women everywhere to invasive principles of abstract justice. 21
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Diversity
Religion and secular ideology are divisive even domestically. In the
international arena, they are more varied in character, and the constraining institutions are
weaker. Hence the culture wars are now international. Many human rights advocates
have a hard time seeing that, for pro-life people, opposition to abortion is a human rights
cause quite as much as opposition to arbitrary imprisonment. 22 The fact of human
diversity includes, not only such ground-level moral controversies, but also completing
understandings of the nature of law and its social role. 23
Different institutions are appropriate to peoples with different circumstances and
histories, and peoples whose ways of life have been destroyed succumb to anomie, a
condition that can be recognized as bad from a number of different normative
perspectives. Moreover, non-Western ways of life might realize goods that consumer
capitalism neglects. Imposing even good institutions on an alien society may fail in
practice and in any case entail serious costs. 24 Nonetheless, just as there are individual
decisions we regard as criminal, there are ways of life that are outside the pale. How we
are to judge which these are is, however, a difficult issue. For these reasons, there is little
language in which the common problems of humanity can be discussed.

The Core Paradox
International law rests on State practice, though it also stands in judgment over
such practice.

States persistently escape, one way or another, apparent international

legal obligations that infringe their ‘vital’ interests, however implausible to external
observers some of these claims of vital interest might be. 25 Hence we get either
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restatements of State practice, which is then legal by definition, or ideals that in theory
stand in judgment on State practice, but in practice can be manipulated to support
whatever some government wants to do.
Finnish jurist Martti Koskenniemi explains the result for the principles of selfdetermination and territorial integrity.
Neither of the conflicting principles can be preferred because they are ultimately
the same. When a people call for territorial integrity, they call for respect for their
identity as a self-determining entity and vice-versa. In order to solve the conflict,
one should need an external principle about which types of human association
entail this respect and which do not. 26
To ask “whether to grant or reject or demand for self-determination … would move the
situation closer to goal values of human dignity” (as Chen puts it with Taiwan in mind) 27
is to ask whether it is a good thing, on the whole, that an internationally ambiguous entity
should gain recognition as a State.
In short, international law is subject to three sources of paradox: first, it takes
fictional more seriously than natural persons; second, it attempts to derive norms from the
anarchic practice of such artificial persons; third, when, despite its bias in favor of States,
it affirms the dignity and inviobility of natural persons, it lacks resources for defending
the claim that we have such dignity or finding out what it implies. The root of these
paradoxes lies in the fact that – even when it talks individual rights and responsibilities or
recognizes entities other than traditional States – international law is concerned group
rather than individual conflict – in terms of crime with genocide rather than murder. 28

9

NATURAL LAW AND REALISM
International law cannot rest on agreement alone. For treaties, including the UN
Charter, require on a prior norm requiring their observance. The foundation of
international law consists in two elements unequally yoked together – one linked to the
sovereignty of the nation-state and one founded on the supra-conventional principle that
States at least should be held to the standards they invoke against others.
Realists hold that moral discourse is out of place in international politics:
arbitration is possible when both parties have the capacity to do one another serious
damage; when they are unequal, the weak must accept whatever terms the strong might
impose. There is now no way of limiting realism to international contexts. Most of us
cannot live with a doctrine according to which the only thing wrong with Hitler’s regime
is that he lost. And the intuitions that oppose realism have a realistic basis. For power
relations are unstable, and asymmetric conflicts sometimes end with the victory of the
weaker party. And, whoever wins at the end of the day, weaker parties can inflict
enough damage to require the stronger party to take them seriously. Even the most
powerful members of the world’s most powerful society can be at the World Trade
Center on 11 September 2001.
The claims of common humanity, and the need for co-operation across national
borders, are urgent. Cassese suggests a hopeful middle way (though one that needs to
be updated) when he argues that, for a norm to bind a State in the absence of its explicit
consent, the most important and representative States of the various blocs agree to it. 29
The following principles of practical reasonableness – Seek peace and keep it, Keep your
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promises, Recognize other human beings as human, Recognize their right to be choose
what we would not, Practice what you preach, See yourself as others see you, and Accept
imperfect solutions – form a sound though incomplete morality.
Terrorism is a radical refusal to recognize the humanity of people who are
somehow other and hence a grave violation of international law and morality. Terrorists,
however, like Allied terror bombers during the Second World War, can always plead
‘supreme emergency,’ and the West is hard pressed to repudiate the premise, 30 especially
when such emergency is now invoked to defend torture. 31
Still, we dare not repudiate secular justice or human law, however inadequate they
may be. Appeals to self-interest can only support hypocrisy, as the tribute vice pays to
virtue, and a life of consistent hypocrisy, as Plato urged long ago, dooms a person to
perpetual sickness of soul.
International law, like all law, serves as a moral educator. But, unlike Mother
Teresa, the law must deal with open, persistent violators of its precepts or lose its
authority.

Law is a compromise between justice and power: 32 its point is to introduce

some elements of justice, however limited, into a system of power relations that without
it would be intolerable. Respecting the finitude of human justice is itself a requirement of
justice. 33 Any system of law requires some authority capable of making the required
judgments of prudence; at present what have is an ill defined something called
‘international public opinion.’
In the absence of politically legitimate appeals to a divine legislator, international
law is a postulate in Kant’s sense, as is the human community that is its source. The
same is true of the sovereign state and its laws. If people are prepared limitlessly to
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indulge in injustice and hypocrisy for the sake of fleshy satisfactions, or press the claims
of justice, as they understand it, until they destroy any possible society, practical
argument comes to an end. 34
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